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The verification theory of meaning as originally put forth by Ayer suffered from
the problem that according to its criterion, any statement, including “green ideas sleep
furiously", was meaningful. This problem did not go away with the reformulation put
forth by Wright. This article proposes a different criterion which aims to preserve
the notion of “verifiability in principle" which Ayer claimed separated the meaningful
from the meaningless. The status of the verification theory as verifiable according to
its own standards is also discussed, and the objections to the theory as unverifiable are
rejected.
1 Introduction
Alfred Jules Ayer (1936 and 1946) made two attempts to set a criterion for a statement
to be meaningful. Although Alonzo Church (1949) argued that both of Ayer’s criteria for
meaning are flawed because they allow any statement to be meaningful, there is a way of
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modifying Ayer’s initial criterion to get around that objection. This modification also gets
around the objection by Byeong-Uk Yi (2001) to Crispin Wright’s (1986) reformulation of
Ayer’s principle. Furthermore, the contention that the verification theory is meaningless by
its own standards is unsupportable.
2 The verification theory and green ideas
2.1 Ayer’s original and amended criteria
In Language, Truth, and Logic, Ayer (1936, pp. 35–36) claimed that a statement is
meaningful if and only if it is an analytic statement, or it is an empirical statement which
is verifiable. Ayer distinguished strong verifiability from weak verifiability, and contended
that either type is sufficient for a statement to be meaningful. A statement is strongly
verifiable if there is an observation statement, or finite set of observation statements, which
can establish its truth or falsity (p. 37). A statement is weakly verifiable if there is an
observation which would “be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood" (p.
38). Ayer used this to justify the assertion that generalisations like "all men are mortal" are
meaningful, although they require an infinite number of observations to verify, and so are
not strongly verifiable.
The problem with Ayer’s original criterion, as he acknowledged in the second edition of
Language, Truth, and Logic (Ayer 1946, p. 17), is that any statement S (for example, “green
ideas sleep furiously") can be made to satisfy weak verifiability by deriving an observation
statement O from S and (S → O) by modus ponens. If O is “the table is brown", then (S
→ O) is “if green ideas sleep furiously, then the table is brown", and S is made meaningful
by virtue of the fact that an observation statement can be deduced from S with the help of
another statement (in this case (S → O)), provided that O could not be deduced from (S → O)
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alone. This leads to the absurd conclusion that “green ideas sleep furiously" is meaningful.
In the introduction to the second edition, Ayer (1946, p. 17) amended the criterion to
draw a distinction, not between the strongly verifiable and weakly verifiable, but between
the directly verifiable and the indirectly verifiable. Either direct or indirect verifiability is
sufficient for meaning. It is not entirely clear why Ayer chose to change his terminology.
Direct verifiability requires that a statement S either be an observation statement or (S ∧ O)
→ T where T is not deducible from O alone and O is an observation statement. A statement
S is indirectly verifiable if (S ∧ Q) → D where D is a directly verifiable statement, D is
not deducible from Q alone, and Q is not "either analytic, directly verifiable, or capable of
being independently established as indirectly verifiable" (Ayer 1946, p. 17).
2.2 Church’s objection
Alonzo Church (1949, p. 53) criticised Ayer’s amended criterion by saying that the same
objection, formulated slightly differently, still defeats it. Church said that any statement
S may be made meaningful according to the new criterion by the following method. Let
O1, O2, and O3 be any three observation statements such that none of them entail any of
the others. Then the statement (¬O1 ∧ O2) ∨ (O3 ∧ ¬S), which will be referred to as P,
is indirectly verifiable, because (P ∧ O1) → O3. If O2 is not deducible from P without S,
then S is indirectly verifiable (and therefore meaningful) because (S ∧ P) → O2. If O2 is
deducible from P without the help of S, then (O3 ∧ ¬S) → O2, which means that ¬S (and
also S) are indirectly verifiable. So either way, S can be made indirectly verifiable, which
means that the new criterion still permits “green ideas sleep furiously" to be meaningful.
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2.3 Wright’s approach
Crispin Wright recognised the need for any formulation of Ayer’s theory to get around
the problem raised by Church. His approach was first set out in (Wright 1986, p. 268)
and revised in (Wright 1989, pp. 616–617). The approach focuses on what Wright called
“compact entailment". Compact entailment differs from regular entailment in that, for S to
compactly entail T, not only must S → T, but if any non-logical constituent in S is replaced,
then S → T no longer holds.
Wright’s formulation, in full, was that a statement S is verifiable if and only if (1) S is an
atomic observation statement; or (2) S is a negation, disjunction, or existential generalisation
of other verifiable statements; or (3) S compactly entails a verifiable statement T and any
compact equivalent of S compactly entails T; or (4) S is entailed by a verifiable statement
and only contains vocabulary found in statements which can be established as verifiable
according to (1)–(3).
2.4 The problem persists
Byeong-Uk Yi (2001) argued that although Wright’s approach gets around Church’s prob-
lem, it is still subject to the same underlying flaw—one can, by the application of Wright’s
rules, say that “green ideas sleep furiously" is meaningful. Broadly, Yi’s proof rests on
two principles: “Thesis II": that any statement S is analytically equivalent with a verifiable
statement T if T compactly entails S; and “Thesis V": any expression occurs in a statement
which is verifiable according to Wright’s (1)–(3).1 So from Thesis II we get that for any
statement S, there is a verifiable statement that compactly entails S, and from Thesis V we
1 The proofs of these are given in (Yi 2001), and little would be gained by reproducing them here. Two
statements are “analytically equivalent", according to Yi, if it is possible to replace expressions within those
statements with their definitions—Yi’s example is “Vixens are animals" is analytically equivalent to “Female
foxes are animals".
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get that the only expressions in S are those which occur in statements which are verifiable




It seems that both of Ayer’s criteria (original and amended) are flawed. Ayer needed to make
weak verifiability sufficient for meaning because if only strong verifiability were sufficient,
then general statements which required an infinite set of observations to verify (an example
Ayer gave was “bodies tend to expand when heated") would be meaningless, as they would
not be strongly verifiable (1936, p. 37). So strong verifiability alone excludes too much
from what is meaningful; strong verifiability and weak verifiability together include too
much (in fact, strong verifiability and weak verifiability together include every statement).
The problem, as Church demonstrated, does not go away if strong and weak verifiability are
replaced by direct and indirect verifiability. So if Ayer’s verification theory is to work, the
criterion must be one which is broader than strong or direct verifiability and narrower than
weak or indirect verifiability. Specifically, it must include generalisations, while excluding
nonsense like “green ideas sleep furiously".
My solution is as follows. Keep the definition of strong verifiability as it originally was:
S is strongly verifiable if there is an observation statement O or finite set of observation
statements {O1, O2, . . . On} which would establish the truth or falsity of S. S is weakly
verifiable if there is a potentially infinite set of statements {S1, S2, . . . } such that (S1 ∧ S2 ∧
. . . ) ↔ S and each Sn is either a strongly verifiable statement or an analytic statement. For
a generalisation like “every person is mortal", for any given person, it is possible to observe
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that the person is mortal, and all of these possible observation statements, in conjunction,
entail that every person is mortal.
3.2 Application of the objections to the solution
3.2.1 The original weakness
Suppose that a detractor of the verification theory wishes to apply the discussed objections
to the proposed solution. The detractor would start with the first objection, that any S
can be made meaningful by using it to deduce O, where O is an observation statement, in
conjunction with the statement (S → O). This objection fails when applied to the proposed
solution because the definition of weak verifiability has changed. It is no longer enough to
say that because “green ideas sleep furiously" and “if green ideas sleep furiously, then the
table is brown" lead to the conclusion “the table is brown", “green ideas sleep furiously"
is meaningful. “Green ideas sleep furiously" is not strongly verifiable because there is no
finite set of observation statements which would verify it, nor can it be broken into any set
of strongly verifiable statements.
3.2.2 Church’s objection
If the detractor then went on to apply Church’s objection, the detractor would run into the
same problem. Both objections revolve around the idea that a person can use an unrelated
statement (in the first objection, S → O, and in Church’s objection, (¬O1 ∧ O2) ∨ (O3
∧ ¬S)), to make a statement weakly or indirectly verifiable that would not otherwise be
verifiable. The proposed solution sets the criterion for weak verifiability as one which
depends entirely on the statement itself, not on what the statement can be made to entail.
So if one works through Church’s objection, one gets the result that P (remember that P ↔
6
(¬O1 ∧ O2) ∨ (O3 ∧ ¬S)) is strongly verifiable for the reason that if one observes (¬O1 ∧
O2), one can verify the truth of P, and equally, if one observes (¬O3 ∧ ¬(¬O1 ∧ O2)), one
can verify the falsity of P. But where the objection falls over now is that P being verifiable
no longer entails that S is verifiable. For S to be weakly verifiable, one would have to come
up with a set of analytic or strongly verifiable statements which would entail S, and neither
the verifiability of P, nor the fact that (S ∧ P) → O2, are relevant to the determination of
that question. So it is no longer possible to prove anything to be meaningful.
3.2.3 Yi’s objection
Yi’s proof that any contingent statement is verifiable goes as follows: for any contingent
statement S, by his Thesis II, there is a verifiable statement T that entails S, and by his Thesis
V, S contains vocabulary that only occurs in statements which are verifiable according to
Wright’s (1)–(3). Therefore S is verifiable according to Wright’s (4) (Yi 2001, p. 418).
This proof, however, does not work if one uses my criterion for verifiability because Wright’s
pesky (4) is out of the picture. For S to be verifiable according to my criterion, not only
would T need to entail S, but S would need to entail T (in order to satisfy the condition
of weak verifiability that S be equivalent to the conjunction of some potentially infinite set
of strongly verifiable statements). So Yi’s method of making any statement verifiable runs
into an obstacle here.
3.3 Another potential objection to the solution
A devotee of Ayer might complain that my approach corrupts Ayer’s intention of creating a
theory of meaning which excludes information which cannot be verified. The devotee would
say that permitting an infinite set of strongly verifiable statements to make a statement weakly
verifiable defeats the point of “verifiability in principle" which Ayer set as the touchstone
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for meaningfulness. As Ayer (1936, p. 37) said, it is not possible, even in principle,
to verify a generalisation like “arsenic is poisonous", and so if one wants generalisations
to be meaningful, strong or “conclusive" verifiability is insufficient. The way that Ayer
originally got around this problem was to make a statement weakly verifiable if there
were observations which would be relevant to the issue of whether it was true or false—
whether “some experiential statements can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain
other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone" (Ayer 1936, p.
39). That, at best, can give one a vague feeling or suspicion as to the truth or falsity of
the statement in question. The devotee would argue that my approach, which defines a
weakly verifiable statement as one which is entailed by an infinite set of strongly verifiable
statements, abandons the “verifiability in principle" notion that Ayer was so attached to. I
would respond that my approach is simply another way of getting around the problem that
Ayer’s relevance criterion got around—the problem that strong verifiability does not include
generalisations. If one gets around the problem, then the route by which the problem is
gotten around does not make much difference, as long as the route does not open up other
difficulties like the possibility of making any statement meaningful. Verifiability in principle
is a useful starting point, but it is not the be-all and end-all of meaning.
4 The broader objection to the verification theory
4.1 The requirement for the verification theory to be meaningful
Another objection to Ayer’s theory, which objects to the theory as a whole and not just
the criterion for meaningfulness, is that by its own standards, the verification theory can
be seen as unverifiable and therefore meaningless. As Zimmerman (1962, p. 334) says,
if a proponent of the verification theory wishes to prove that the verification principle is
meaningful, the proponent must either prove that the verification theory is analytic, or that
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the verification theory is a verifiable empirical statementthose being the two possibilities
for a meaningful statement. I am in agreement with Zimmerman that the verification theory
is analytic, but disagree with him that it is not empirical and verifiable.
4.2 A statement may be both analytic and empirical
I proceed on the notion that it is possible for a statement to be both analytic and empirical.
For example, “all bachelors are unmarried" is both analytic and empirical. It is true by
definition—being a bachelor requires being unmarried—and it is also empirically true,
because one can observe the marital status of every bachelor to determine that all bachelors
are, indeed, unmarried.
4.3 Zimmerman’s arguments against the verification theory being em-
pirical
Zimmerman (1962, p. 334) dismisses the possibility of the verification theory being an
empirical statement for the reason that for it to be verifiable, it would require “an empirical
survey of a vast number of empirical statements to accumulate evidence". But this is
not a problem for my reformulated criterion, as it permits weakly verifiable statements
to be entailed by an infinite set of analytic or strongly verifiable statements—for every
meaningful statement S is it possible to form an analytic statement of the form “According
to the criterion for meaning, S is meaningful". There would obviously be an infinite number
of these analytic statements, and taken together, they would entail that the verification theory
is weakly verifiable.
Zimmerman goes on to say that even if this empirical survey could be undertaken, there
would have to be some criterion other than the verification principle itself to determine
9
whether those statements were meaningful. But I contend that there is no reason why this
has to be the case. If I say that “all integers which have a remainder of zero when divided
by two are even", there is no need for me to apply some criterion other than “x is even if
x is an integer and has a remainder of zero when divided by two" when determining the
parity of integers to prove my initial statement. That is simply the definition of an even
number. Similarly, when I say that “all statements which are either analytic or are empirical
and strongly or weakly verifiable are meaningful", it is not necessary to apply a different
criterion when proving that the statement holds.
4.4 Barnes’ argument against the verification theory being analytic
Even if one accepts Zimmerman’s arguments as to why the verification theory cannot be
regarded as an empirical statement, I am in agreement with him that it is analytic. For the
verification principle to be analytic, it would have to be true by definition. Barnes (1950, p.
117) writes:
[T]he principle that “only verifiable statements have meaning", needs to be
completed by the addition of the phrase “in the sense of the meaning in which it
means verifiable". Now this makes it an analytic statement. It also completely
draws its teeth. For it can no longer be used to argue that metaphysical
statements are meaningless. For they may well be meaningful in some other
“proper use".
I disagree with Barnes that adding the phrase “in the sense of the meaning in which it
means verifiable" makes the principle useless for proving that metaphysical statements are
meaningless. The idea that metaphysical statements can be meaningful in some other sense
of the word meaningful is neither here nor there. The verification theory says that, as
Zimmerman (1962, p. 341) puts it, “in everyday and scientific language when a statement is
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uttered which claims to be true or false", metaphysical statements are meaningless because
there are no conditions which can verify or disprove them. The fact that a statement may be
morally meaningful, or meaningful by some other definition, does not make it cognitively
meaningful—it is not capable of being verifiable in the sense that empirical statements are,
and should therefore not be treated as though it is empirical.
5 Conclusion
Even though neither Ayer’s original criterion nor his amended criterion of meaning stand up
to scrutiny, there is a way of modifying the original criterion to get around the critical error
that it is possible to show that any statement is meaningful according to his criterion. The
objection that the verification theory is meaningless by its own standards can also be refuted,
either by establishing that the verification theory is weakly verifiable, or alternatively by
establishing that it is analytic.
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